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:-ITA'rKl\lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
'l'his proceeding involves the review of a majority 
Lle~isiou of the State Tax Commission upholding a de-
ficiency use tax assessment against plaintiff in the sum 
of $888.42, and is concerned with the question of wheth-
Pr or not the railroad industry in Utah is "commercial" 
in nature within the scope of Section 59-15-4, UCA, 1953, 
as amended, which imposes the tax on ''gas, electricity, 
hPat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished for 
rlumt·stic or commercial consumption.'' 
Dl8PO~ITION BEFORE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMIS.SION 
Following formal hearing, the State Tax Commission 
1
' 8UPd a Decision, one Commissioner dissenting, uphold-
ing- the deficiency assessment. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the majority ruling of tht 
defendant and judgment in its favor as a matter of la11 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute between the parties as to the ma 
terial facts of this ease. They were the subject of a 1n;1 
ten stipulation introduced at the formal hearing, allii 
show the following: 
Section 59-15-4 (a) UCA, 1953, as amended, impose; 
a sales tax upon retail sales of tangible personal proper~. 
but specifically exempts all sales of "coal, fuel oil and 
other fuels" except as provided in subsection (b). Thii! 
1 
subsection imposes a sales tax on "gas, electricity, heat. 
coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished for domesfr 
or commercial consumption." (R. 22, 23) 
The foregoing provisions of the sales tax act mean 
that all noncommercial sales and consumption of enerr· 
or fuel in the State of Utah are exempt from the sale> 
tax, and pursuant to the holding of this court in U11i' 1• 
Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commis~ion. 
110 Utah 152, 1'76 P. 2d 879 (1947), froru the use ta.\' 31 
well. ( R. 22) 
During all times mentioned herein Union Pacifi 
Railroad Company has been aud is a Utah corporati 111 
engaged as a common carrier by railroad of freight an' 
passengers for hire in intrastate commerce within Ftai; 
as well as in interstate commerce in lTtah and surronnn 
3 
iiig ~latl:'8. (R 7) The predominant character and nature 
nl' its business is the ownership, operation and main-
!f'nanel' of a public service transportation system by rail 
in 1rhieh all or substantially all of its operating property 
is (kvoted to the transportation of property and persons 
un>r lirn·s and terminals having fixed locations. Almost 
nll of Union Pacific's functions are incidental to and in 
t!if' iwrfonnance of said transportation business. (R. 10) 
ln !:laid transportation business Union Pacific pur-
,Jias<'~, stores, ust>s and/or consumes large amounts and 
quantities of energ>· and fuel. Of these, the most import-
ant for railroad purposes is locomotive fuel oil which 
i~ used for the propulsion of Union Pacific's locomotives. 
In this regard neither Union Pacific nor the railroad 
induHtr)· gent>rally operating in Utah has ever paid sales 
and use taxes on purchases of locomotive fuel oil used 
fnr thP propulsion of locomotive engines since the legis-
lahm0 Pxempted from the sales tax all sales of coal, fuel 
oil and other fuels furnished for other than domestic or 
commercial consumption on March 18, 1943. Such con-
011111ption h~· the railroad industry has always been 
crm;;idered by it to bt> noncommercial and therefore ex-
f'H1pt. Tlw State Tax Commission has been in complete 
ag-r0PmPnt with that position since it issued a formal 
ruling to that effect on November 7, 1945, and has con-
timwrl. to exempt such consumption until July 1, 1965. 
(H, 10, 21, 23) 
'rli<• ehange and reversal of position by defendant 
i··a" dnP to an Opinion of the Utah Attorney General, 
Xii, fiii-!l:~8, whieh provides as follows: 
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"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEKEl:LIL 
"STATE OF UTAH 
"OPINION OF LAW 
No. 65-038 
"Requested by Donald T. Adams, Chairman, LM 
State Tax Commission. Opinion by Attorney Gr'li 
eral Phil L. Hansen and staff. 
"QUESTION 
"Are sales within the State of Utah of ga;, 
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fu1J, 




"Section 59-15---1, Utah Code Annotated, HJj:'., 
provides in part: 
"'From and after the effective date of tl1i· 
act there is levied and there shall he eollP11 
ed and paid: 
" '* >/(:. * 
" '(b) A tax equivalent to two and orn·-linl' 
per cent of the amount paid. 
" '* * * 
" ' ( 2) To any person as defined in ~]Ji,; :1' 
including municipal corporations for, ~ 
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil or other fw· 
sold or furnished for domestic or co1rn 11P1 
cial consumption ... ' 
5 
"'l'his section has been interpreted as taxing 
'coal ... furnished for domestic or commercial 
commmption' but not coal furnished for' industrial 
<·onsurni;tion.' (Union Portland Cement Co. v. 
State Tax Cormnission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 
Hi-!, modified on rehearing 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 
879, ( 19+7 ).) 
"''l1his opinion was requested as to whether 
sak of coal, etc., to railroads is subject to the sales 
tax. 
''ln view of the foregoing statute and inter-
pretation, the narrower questien seems to be 
whether or not the sale of coal, etc., to railroads 
is in the nature of a sale for commercial consump-
tion or in the nature of a sale for industrial con-
limnption '? If commer·cial, it is apparently tax-
;1 hle; i r industrial, it is apparently not. 
'"l'he cases which are concerned with defining 
' 1·01m1wrcial' and 'industrial' are not easily synthe-
si11Pd, since they arise under widely varying fact 
situations and statutorv schemes. (Reiser v. 
Meyer, 323 S.W. 2d 514,.Mo., 1959.) However, a 
111<"aningful distinction has been made in some 
l'<lSl'8 which say that fuel 'rnuld be used commer-
('iall)' when used merely to assist in the exchange 
(Jf goods and services. (United Sta.tes v. Public 
Sc1Tice C'o. of Colorad-o, 143 F.2d 79, 10th Cir., 
19-t+; Reiser v. Meyer, supra; Jordan v. Tashiro, 
~IS tr.s. 123, 1928) and industrially when used to 
rnannfacture or fabricate materials. (North Whit-
tier Hei,r;hts C. Ass'n v. National Labor Relations 
floord, 109 F.2d 76, 1940; Mitrdock v. City of 
Xorf711N1od, 67 N.E. 2d 867, 870, Ohio, 1946.) 
"ThP law in Utah pertaining to this question 
shonld he explained by looking at both of these 
<l<'finitions and at what appears to be the justifica-
tion for making any distinction at all between 
industrial and commercial uses. 
6 
"The rationale in not taxing sales of coal 1.:. 
for industrial purposes seems to be that th(: ,.;,
1
,1 
of such materials is included in the price or u
11 
article manufactured or fabricated, which artitJ, 
is eventually taxed. 
''Sales of coal for commercial consumptir11 , 
are taxed because the cost of the coal is not a, 
closely connected with the product upon whi('li 
there is an ultimate tax, or the use to which th" 
coal is put results in a product or service upon 
which there is no tax. Therefore, if a tax on sur·i1 
sales is to be collected at all, it must be collec!i:il 
at the time the coal is sold to the commercial user. 
"This interpretation is in accord with tl11 
holding in the Union Portland Cement case, su1Ji'a. 
That case dealt with purchase of coal in Wyomin, 
to be used for heating kilns used in the manufac 
ture of cement in Utah. The case indicated that 
the production of cement was an industrial acti 
vity. The Court stated that while the coal did not 
enter into and become an ingredient or component 
part of the manufactured product so as to lwcorn1 
exempt as a wholesale sale under Section 59-1:1.; 
(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, nevertheleii. 
since it was employed in an industrial use, il \la' 
not subject to either the Utah sales or use tax. 
since the Utah Sales Tax Act exempts ~ales of r·o<ii 
for industrial uses. 
•"rhus, the exemption of coal for indu:;tna! 
use seems to have a similar basis as the exempt\1111 
of wholesale sales; that is, the tax will be f•ollecfr1! 
later on the finished product. However, actna' 
incorporation of the coal into the manufarturid 
product is not a requirement to qualif~' for tL· 
industrial exemption. 
"This rationale also provides a rpasonah!· 
hasis for the holding in thP recent casP of 0111!' 
Union R.R. Depot Co. v. 8tatr Tn.r Co111111 1s1•111 ' 
u; l 1tah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57, modified on rehearing 
Utah 2d ______ , 399 P.2d 145 (1964). There, 
('nal was purchased in -Wyoming and used in Utah 
in the plaintiff's business of repairing railroad 
t•qniprnent. The coal was not used to manufacture 
a product which subsequently was going to be 
:-;nhjeet to the Utah sales tax. 'fhe Court held that 
:-:neh a use was commercial and, therefore, taxable. 
"A further gl1ide is provided in the case of 
lT'isco11sin Electric Pou·rr Co. v. United States, 
:i31; l ~.N. 1'/G ( 1948). There, the Court said that in 
<lderrn ining wheth<:>r a business is industrial or 
('OHm1ercial, one must look at the "predominant 
drnrader" of th<:> business. 
"l t appears that the question of this opinion 
lllUst he answ<:>red b~, applying the definitions and 
guide sugg<:>sted above, together with the purpose 
for tJrn cornrn<:>rcial-industrial distinction as dis-
r·nsse<l. In so doing, it is believed that the pre-
dominant character of the railroad business is 
(·onnnercial in nature; that is, it does not involve 
manufacturing or fabrication. The fact that th<:> 
hn;.;iness of the railroad does not consist in that 
t:-pP of activity upon which a Utah sales tax is 
P\'Pntnally levied would, in view of the intention 
of the PXemption, also classify the sale of coal, etc., 
to railroads as commercial. Since the application 
of Hw factors discussed herein leads to the con-
<'111sion that th<:> sale of coal is for a commt'rcial 
nsP, s1wh a sal<:> is subjt'ct to the Utah sales tax. 
R<:>spectfully submitted, 
( s) PHIL L. HANSEN 
PLH/jbr./bv 
G/2:1/fi5 
Attorney General Phil L. Hansen" 
m. 7. s. 23, 24-26) 
8 
In accordance with and based on said Opinion rJ, , 
fendant jssued a sales and use tax bulletin containin' 
a notification that effective July 1, 19G5, all t-:ales ,1; 
gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil and other fueb Kolil 
to rajlroads would be considered subject to the sales tax. 
and all storage, use or other consumption of such itP111 , 
in Utah by railroads in connection with out-of-state pur-
chases, would be subject to the use tax. (R. 8, 27) 
Upon receipt of said notice plaintiff advised defend-
ant that in its view the Attorney General's Opinion ami 
the position of the State Tax Commission pursuant there 
to was in error, and that said sales and use in Utal1 
were exempt from the sales and use tax laws. Plaintiff 
also indicated that the validity of the Opinion would lie 
contested. To do so plaintiff presented to defendant the 
factual data on three out-of-state purhases of locomotive 
fuel oil which occurred in July of 1965. Two of the pm 
chases came from Sinclair, Wyoming, and one came from 
Denver, Colorado. All three were delivered to Union 
Pacific's storage facilities at Ogden, Utah, and thereafter 
used by it for propulsion of locomotives in the operation 
of its railroad, including switch engines and road engim;, 
both in passenger and in freight service. (R. 8, 9) 
Following receipt of the information concerning sa 11l 
out-of-state purchases totaling $25,383.23 defendant if-
sued and served a deficiency use tax assessment npuu 
plaintiff for the period July, 1965, and assessed a use tai 
against plaintiff in the sum of $888.42 on said ont-of-$ta!i 
purchases. The "remarks'' section of the deficiency :F 
sessment states: 
9 
"rrl1is audit assesses Utah use tax on pur-
chases of locomotive fuel oil listed on Exhibit A-1, 
and is assessed in accordance with Attorney Gen-
t•ral's Opinion 65-038 that sales of energy and fuel 
oil to railroads are subject to tax." ( R. 9) 
The factual details of said purchases by plaintiff 
and the subsequent use thereof in its railroad business 
am rl'presentative of a general practice by plaintiff 
1rliich has been in existence for over 20 years. Plaintiff 
ltas also made similar purchases of fuel oil within the 
~tnt(' of Utah for the same type use over the same period. 
Said purd1ases as outlined represent only a small per-
centage of the overall purchases, use and consumption 
nf fuel by plaintiff in Utah for the propoulsion of loco-
u10tives transporting persons and property in the oper-
ation of its railroad business. All other railroads in 
bu8iness in Ftah have similar operations with respect to 
tltr purchase, storage, use and consumption of locomotive 
fud oil, and have paid no sales or use taxes to the State 
of Utah on the same. (R. 10) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Tl-m Ll~GISLATURE INTENDED TO EX-
EJ;\f PT THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY FROM 
SALES AND USE TAX ON THE PUR-
CHASE AND CONSFMPTION OF FUEiL· OIL 
F'OR rr1rn~ PROPULSION OF LOCOMO-
'I'fYES, AND THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
LONO-STANDlNG ADMINISTRATIVE REC-
OG:NITION THEREOF HAS BEEN ENTIRE-
LY PROPER. 
1'axability in this case is dependent upon the con-
~trurtion to he placed upon the provisions of Section 59-
10 
15-4(a), UCA, 1953, as amended, which ::,;pecifically l'i 
empts the sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels from tJ1" 
tax, except as provided in subsection (b) wherp a sa!~, 
tax is imposed upon "gas, electricity, heat,, coal, fuel oll 
or other fuels sold or furnished for domestic or connnet-
cial consumption." 
The basic judicial approach for proper statutnn 
construction is to carry out what the legislature had in 
mind at the time of the enactment. That principlP wa' 
recently applied in Johnson vs. State Tax Commission, 
17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d. 831 (Utah, 1966), where thi~. 
court observed: 
"The fundamental consideration which trans-
cends all others in regard to the interpretation 
and application of a statute is: What was the 
intent of the legislature~ All of the rules of statu-
tory construction are subordinate to it and an 
helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining 
that objective. In determining that intent the 
statute should be considered in the light of the pm-
pose it was designed to serve and so applied as to 
carry out that purpose if that can be done consis-
tent with its language.'' 
In the application of that fundamental principle to 
the present case we are fortunate in having a legislativ1• 
history which is explicitly clear in establishing legislative 
intent without the need for the court to rely npon pen 
pheral rules of statutory construction. That legislative 
history graphically illustrates, as we will hereinaftN 
point out, that the lawmakers intended to exempt rail-
roads from the sales and use tax on locomotive fuel oil. 
11 
Th<:' Pxemption for noncommercial consumption of 
,·oal, fuel oil and other fuels was first added to the Utah 
::ialPs tax act by chapter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943, effective 
March 18, 1943. However, the basic statutory exemption 
from the 8alt's tax for noncommercical consumption was 
a .part of the original Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. 
(H. 14) Aecordingly, to acquire the complete legislative 
history as well as the administration of said exemption 
h)' tlH' State Tax Commission, it is necessary to review 
certain material events which go back to the early 1930's. 
Tlw origin of the present statutory provision con-
terning dome8tic and commercial consumption in the Sales 
Tax Ad is found in Section 4 (b) of Chapter 63, Laws of 
L'tah, 1933, commonly known as the Emergency Revenue 
"1r·t of 1933. That section provided that "all services ren-
dered or commodities furnished for domestic or commer-
<'ial consumption by any utility of the State of Utah," 
1rhirh was under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities 
Commission, were subject to the sales tax. (R.14) 
Effrctive August 3, 1933, the Second Special Session 
uf the legi8lature amended Section 4(b) to provide that 
tlw sales tax would apply only "to gas, electric and heat 
eorporation8 * * * for gas, electricity, or heat, furnished 
for dompstic or commercial consumption.'' (R. 15, 16) 
'l'he 1933 legislature obtained the basic language for 
f-lPetion +( h) from a similar provision which was then con-
tain('d in Section 616(a) of the Federal Revenue Act 
of 19:12. In addition, and of material significance in the 
presPnt case, the Utah legislature adopted the federal 
ler;i~lativP hi8tory of said provision as well as the federal 
12 
regulations promulgated with respect thereto. ln fatt 
I 
said history and regulations, along with Section 616(a), 
provided both the source and the background for Section 
4 ( b) of Chapter 63, Laws of Utah, 1933, as well as thi 
regulations of the Tax Commission pertaining thereto. 
(R. 13, 14) 
Section 616 (a) as originally enacted on June 6, 19:J~, 
by the 72nd Congress, imposed a tax "for electrical energy 
for domestic or commercial consumption * * *." On 
June 16, 1933, the 73rd Congress amended the section 
to shift the tax from the consumer to the vendor. (R. lU, 
11) 
The original provision was first proposed as a Sen-
ate amendment to the Revenue Act of 1932 in the fol1011-
ing language : 
"There is hereby imposed upon energy sold by 
privately owned operating electrical power com-
panies a tax equivalent to 3 per cent of the price 
for which so sold.'' 72 Congressional Record, page 
12054. (R. 11) 
The amendment was ref erred to a Conf errncr Cmn-
mittee, which reported: 
" ... This amendment imposes a tax of 3 Jltl 
cent of the sale price of electrical energy sold hY 
privately owned, operating electrical power com: 
panies. The House recedes with an a111ernh11t·H', 
substituting a tax of 3 per cent of the prire paJU 
for electrical energy for domestic or comrnereinl 
use (as distinguished from industrial use), to lw 
paid by the purchaser and collected by the ven~or 
... " H. R. (Conf. Report) No. 1492, 72nd (on 
gress, 1st Session, page 22. (R. 11) 
13 
'rile Confon•nce Heport was accepted. 72 Congres-
,,i(mal l{p(•ord, page 12071. (R. 12) 
On May 11, 1933, the Senate debated and discussed 
the proposed amendment to Section 616 (a) to shift the 
tax from the consumer to the vendor. The material com-
ments are set out in Volume 77, Congressional Record, 
Letwccn pages 3212 and 3217 : 
Senator Harrison, a member of the Senate Finance 
Committee, which favorably reported the Revenue Act, 
iu dis(·rn.;8sing the proposed revision in 1933, said: 
" ... I am tellling the Senators nothing new 
when I remind them that we had a fight here in 
1932 over the imposition of this tax. The Senate 
imposed a 3 per cent electric-energy tax, and it 
was finally adopted, to be collected from the con-
sumer of electrical energy. We applied that only 
nn domestic and commercial energy; that is, elec-
tric ent>rgy used in stores and dwellings that are 
elassified as commercial and domestic. There was 
no tax in the 1932 Act imposed upon energy em-
ploypd in industry." 
Mr. Robinson of Indiana: "I am asking the Senator 
Dir. Harrison) for information because I know he is 
\°('l'Y familiar with the subject. I have had a number of 
'inquiri<>s with reference to a 1 per cent tax assessed 
ct~ain~t electric railways. Does the Senator call that in-
rln,trial enn·gy ?" 
1fr. Hanison: "Yes, I think that is industrial ener-
~1.'' rn. 11, 12) 
14 
This excerpt clearly indicates that Congress intPllf]1.,• 
the railroad industry to qualify as an exempted indu8tn:ii 
user. 
Further evidence showing that the Senate intPnrled 
the railroad industry to be exempt from the tax impoReil 
on commercial consumption under Section 61() (a)," 
shown by the proposal at page 3216 (which wa8 not 
adopted) to include a proviso "that this tax shall nu' 
apply to the sale of electric energy sold for manufactur. 
ing purposes." 
In arguing against the amendment, at page :l2E. 
Senator Reed said: 
"Furthermore, the Senator's amendment wo11lii 
exempt manufacturing concerns if they buy indu.' 
trial current but does not exempt the trolle.1 
lines which are now in receivership or on tlw verg1• 
of it. The Senator from Nebraska does not exernpt 
railroad companies which are having a bad tiuw 
now. Many manufacturing concerns are far hPt!Pt 
able to pay the 3 per cent tax than are the railroad 
companies and the trolley lines which will finrl 
themselves taxed under it. It is a wholly unju,i 
discrimination." (R. 12) 
The federal regulation applicable to 616(a), whid 1 
was promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Ren 
nue in 1932, and again in 1933 following the amendment 
to Section 616 (a), -is even more explicit. It provided ii 
part: 
"Scope of tax. The tax is imposed u110:. 
electrical energy sold for domestic or eomroer<'1•; 
consumption and not for resale, except as pro\1' 
ed hereinafter. 
15 
'''l'he term 'electrical energy sold for do-
mestic or commercial consumption' does not in-
<' 1 ude ( 1) electrical energy sold for industrial 
consumption, e.g., for use in manufacturing, 
processing, mining, refining, shipbuilding, build-
ing construction, irrigation. etc., or (2) that sold 
for other uses which likewise can not be classed 
as domestic or commercial, such as the electrical 
t>nergy used by public utilities, waterworks, tele-
graph, telephone and radio communication com-
panies, railroads, other common carriers, edu-
cational institutions not operated for profit, 
rhmches, and charitable institutions. However, 
electrical energy is subject to tax if sold for use 
in commercial phases of industrial or other busi-
nesses, such as in office buildings, sales and dis-
play rooms, retail stores, etc." Emphasis added. 
(R. 13) 
Hecognizing the intent of the Utah legislature in its 
enactment of ~<:>ction ±(b) of the Emergency Revenue 
Ad of 19:l:3, and following the basic language of the fore-
going federal regulation, the State Tax Commission is-
'ned its regulation on the effective date of the Emergency 
Revenu(o Act with respect to the scope of domestic and 
r·onuuercial <'onsmnption. Said regulation provided in 
part, as follows: 
"All services rendered or commodities fur-
nished the consumer by a utility are taxable, ex-
rrpt: 
"(1) Services rendered or commodities fur-
Hisl1ed for industrial consumption, e.g., those used 
in lllanufacturing, processing, mining, refining, 
building construction, etc., and 
"(~) 11hose rendered or furnished for other 
1ises which likewise cannot he classed as domestic 
16 
or commercial, such as public utilities, watenl'oit 
irrigation companies, telegraph, telephonl:' uni' 
radio communication companies, railroad!), 'r,t]i, 1 
common carriers, educational institution~ 1111 
operated for profit, churches and charitabk· in1t1 
tutions." Emphasis added. (R. 15) 
No change of any significance occurred in said regn 
lation until July 1, 19·±-±, and no change was made in (Ji, 
statute until 1\Iarch 18, 19±3. Of course, during that Pntiie 
period the railroad industry was exempted from tlw ~aJ,, 
tax on amounts paid for gas, electricity and heat. 
The effect of the exemption afforded users of ga,, 
electricity and heat furnished for other than dom('st11 
or commercial consumption placed producers of, dea!Pr, 
in, and consumers of coal, fuel oil and other fm•ls at a 
competitive disadvantage. (R. 17) Accordingl~', th(' 19-l:! 
legislature enacted Chapter 93, effective l\Iareh 18, l~H 
again amending Section 4 of the Emergency Revenue Act 
of 1933. The amendment expanded the exemption fn: 
noncommercial consumption to include "coal, fupl oii 
and other fuels." (R. 18). 
Chapter 93 was introduced as Senate Bill 17~ awl 
was prepared by the State Tax Commission. It was spon 
sored by legislators who were residents of coal-produ('iu~ 
areas for the purpose of removing the diseriminali 1111 
which had resulted to Utah coal producers, fuel oil ]lfi' 
ducers and other fuel producers from an imposition of a 
tax on sales of such products for other than domestic 11 
commercial consumption. In its consideration and 1''1• 
actment of Chapter 93 the legislature had before it awi 
relied u1wn the prior construction of the phrase "clon1" 
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tic and eo11miereial eonsumption" from the original Emer-
".''ll".\' H('V('nUP Act, together with the Tax Commission's 
n'gnlatiorn; applicable thereto. (R. 19). This had the 
!'radical pffoet of exempting the railroad industry from 
the tax on coal, fuel oil and other fuels to the same extent 
and in th<~ same manner as had been the case with gas, 
eledricit)' and heat from the effective date of the Emer-
i-'.('Dl'Y Hov(•nue Act of 1933. 
Jn fact, immediately following the enactment of Chap-
t~r 9:J, the Commission advised vendors and purchasers 
of cmtl, fuel oil and other fuels that the purchase and 
m;e th('n'of for the propulsion of locomotives in the op-
''ration of a railroad was not a use for domestic or com-
1111"n·ial consumption and that said use was exempt from 
!he tax. (R 19) 
Sinee the enactment of Chapter 93, there has been 
110 material change in the statutory language of Section 
-1( lJ) of tltP Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended, 
\\'ith res]J<:>ct to the legislative exemption for gas, elec-
trir·it)', heat, eoal, fuel oil or other fuels furnished for 
11thPr than domestic or commercial consumption. The 
Jl1h<'nt provision is Section 59-15--1-, Utah Code Anno-
~~11·d, Hl5:~, as amended. (R. 22) 
Newrtlteless, there was a brief reversal in the ad-
tuini8trative handling of the exemption with respect to 
t\ip railroad industrv by the Tax Commission shortly 
al'ter Chapter 93 became effective. It began on January 1, 
::1-1~. mth a revision of the regulation relating to the 
'1d'inition of commercial use. The revised regulation 
Jirii\ idPd in part: 
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"Commercial use means the use conm~t,.11 
with trade or commerce, or a use used in the cr 111 • 
mercial phases of industrial or other businPK.'r, 
For example, thP use of Plertricity to light a n•tai 
store is a commercial use and the use of eh·drieit' 
to light the administrative offices of an indu~t1iir: 
concern is in the nature of a commercial U~t>. Tlr' 
tax upon gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, 01 
other fuels applies only to the sale or furni~hi11~ 
of such services for domestic or commercial f'rJll 
surnption. \Vhere the consumer has all ga~. Plw 
tricity or heat used at a given location fnrni.,lir·r 
through one meter, the predominant character nl 
the business carried on at such location shall i\1 
termine the classification of the consumption ril 
~mch product for the purpose;,; of the Act." (R. ;i;i 
On .January 10, 1944, thP Commission isstwd arr 
order advising vendors and vendees of gas, elPdriei\.1 
heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels of its opinion that t\1" 
use of such materials or pnergy for the JJUrpose of haul 
ing freight or passengers by railroad was a comnwrern1 
consumption and therefore taxable under Chapter 93. T\1, 
Commission further advised that the sale of such enef,!." 
and fuel from and after January 15, 19+.t, wonlrl Ii 
subject to the imposition of the tax. (R. 20) 
Between January 15, 1944, and February 29, 10-H 
'rhe Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Cornpan 
(hereinafter called Rio Grande) purchased from Ftal 
Fuel Company a quantity of coal which was ns<'<l anr! 
consumed primarily for the propulsion of locomoti11 
used by the Rio Grande in the operation of its railroarl 
The Commission denied the Rio Grande's claiuwd 
emption from the sales tax for such use and consumptior 
based upon its order of January 10, 1944, and Rio Grm111 
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11 \t'<l a pdition before the Commission alleging that such 
,,Ji(•c. of coal wen-• fully exempt on the grounds that said 
1 oal 11 as not sold or furnished for domestic or commercial 
l'OJl~\llll]JtiOn. ( R. 21) 
Following a hearing on said petition, the Tax Com-
u1i~sion h.v a formal decision dismissed the case on No-
1·pm]wr 7, 1945, expressly recognizing therein that the use 
and <·onsumvtion of coal for the propulsion of Rio 
Grande 's locomotives was not a commercial consumption 
11ithin the proper scope and meaning of Chapter 93. 
:H. 21) 
ln addition, the Tax Commission issued a Bulletin 
on October 19, 1945, revoking its order of January 10, 
l 9+-1-, and readopting the construction and practice the 
Commission had followed from the enactment of the 
J~mergency Revenue Act in 1933 to 1943, to the effect that 
'uch USP and consumption by railroads did not constitute 
cmnmrrrial use and the sale or furnishing of such items 
tu railroads was not taxable. (R. 21) 
1'111· regulation defining commercial use issued on 
.Jairnar>· 1, 194+, has never been altered by the Tax Com-
1uis0ion to the present date even though at least eight 
additional r!:'visions of the sales and use tax regulations 
liurp oernrred since that time. And, since the formal 
'
111 ing of the Commission in the Rio Grande case and 
:1i,. 1 ~~nanee of the Tax Commission's Bulletin on Octo-
J,"1 1 'J, 10-1-5, there has been no effort or attempt on the 
1iait or the Commission to impose a sales or use ta.x on 
:Jt,. eii11snmption of coal, fuel oil or other fuels in loco-
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motives, and the Tax Conunission has recognized th(',., 
emption of such use and consumption during that ent11, 
period of time and until July 1, 1965. The chang1 
and reversal of position by the Commission was dnf' tr 
Opinion No. 65-038 of the Attorney General. ( R. 2:1) 
vVe believe the foregoing outline of the legislafo, 
history of Section 4(b) persuasively establishe8 the in 
tention of the legislature and that further argument will! 
respect thereto ·would be superfluous. H is abundanth 
clear that the lawmakers intended to exclude and exPlllJll 
the railroad industry from the sales and u:::;e tax on tl1c 
purchase, storage and consumption of locomotive hwl 
oil. We now ask this court to enforce that intent. 
In addition, we have pre:::;ented the eontemporaneon· 
and administrative construction given the statutory Ian 
guage by the Tax Commission which has been in comple11 
harmony with the legislative history, with one brief inli'1 
lude, for a long period of tirne. Such construction a1l1 
practice by the Tax Commission is entitled to recel1 1 
great weight before the court. See State vs. Hatch, 9 rtali 
2d 288, 34-2 P.2d 1103 (1959), and UndercoflPr v. East1r1 
Airlines, Inc., 147 SE 2d 436 (Ga., 1966). 
POINT II 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION NO. 65-
038 IS ERRONEOUS AND SHOTTLD BE DIS-
CARDED. 
Although this appeal is for the purpose of reviewlnr 
the majority decision of the Tax Commission upholrlin; 
h d · · n an'
1 
the deficiency use tax assessment, :•rince t e ee1s10 · 
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tl11· a:;s(•:;smcnt are both predicated upon Attorney Gen-
1.ral'c: Opinion No. 65-038, we will proceed to an exami-
1w(io11 of its validity. 
Jn the light of the established legislative intent with 
re~pert to the statute imposing a ta-\: for energy and fuel 
":;old or furnished for domestic or commercial consump-
tion,'' the misconceptions in and fallacious conclusion of 
Opinion No. G5-038 become readily apparent. In fact only 
a C'msory examination reveals its vulnerability. 
Ac{·ording to that Opinion, the law in Utah on the 
r1nP~tion of whether or not sales of energy and fuel to 
rnilroads is taxable under Section 59-15-4 is dependent 
u1JOn thP applieation of three factors or guides: 
Tlw fin;t factor is to apply the definitions of "com-
111neial" and "industrial." However, in establishing their 
11waning, the Opinion indiscriminately looks to all cases 
nn any subject matter where one or both of these terms 
liayp been involved. ·while conceding that the cases are 
not easil~, s)·nthesized, the Opinion does arrive at what it 
l':tll~ "a J11Paningful distinction" which ''has been made 
Ill 'UlllP eases which say that fuel would be used commer-
l'iall~· \I lien m;ed merely to assist in the exchange of goods 
and ::wrvicPs * * * and industrially when used to manu-
facture or fabricate materials." In making this distinction 
iltp Opinion ignores the only case where both terms are 
'''11 'l(k•recl in connection with railway transportation. 
Ill Slate cs. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W. 2d 513 (1938), 
a .\[i,s()uri statute taxed all sales of electricity to "do-
1'hAi<', <·ornrnercial and industrial consumers" of electric 
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current. An effort was made to impose the tax on t[1, 
current used by a street railway in propelling street 
rail cars. The court held that transportation of passen 
gers on street railway cars was neither commercial nor 
industrial and points out that several Public Senici· 
Commissions as well as the Federal Power Commissiou 
have classified the various users of electricity into si.1 
categories: domestic, commercial, industrial, sale of ~lee 
tricity to railroads, municipalities, and to other utilitie.' 
for resale. 
\Ve agree that the definitions selected by the Attor 
ney General can be found in some cases. But at the sam1· 
time, it is apparent that by their nature both ternrn ta11 
be construed in innumerable ways, and differences ot 
opinion as to their meaning can and often do occur. b 
other words we are dealing with language whirh i· 
susceptible to ambiguity and uncertainty. Therein, \1'1 
think, lies the fallacy of the abstract technique employeo 
in the Attorney General's Opinion. The scatter-gun a11 
proach in defining an ambiguous word in a statute run; 
the substantial risk of employing the wrong definitio11 
as exemplified by this Opinion. 
Rather than guess at the legislative intent, refern1t" 
should have been made to the language of the statut1 
the subject matter of the Act, its legislative history, a111 • 
• 1· 
any other acceptable aid to statutory construction. ~· 
C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 351, Norville vs. State Tax C0111 1111 • 
sion, 98Utah170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940). 
. - . . ,j'. 
In this regard, and in contrast to said Opm1on, · 
believe a proper approach in arriving at tlw corr1' 
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(Hinitions of commercial and industrial in this case was 
taken by Conunissioner Gunther in his dissenting opinion 
to the Tax Commission's Decision. He cogently points out 
that the tax imposed by subsection (b) of 59-15--± on fuels 
i:- n0t a tax of gt>neral imposition, but actually is one of 
Ji111iti>cl imposition because of the general undefined tax 
1•xPmption for such fuels in subsection (a). (R. 72) In 
1Jtlti·r 1rnrds the legislature intended to exempt every 
transaction relating to fuels unless specifically qualifying 
within the limited area to be taxed. This requires a strict 
('onstrndion of the word "commercial,'' since it is in the 
area to be taxed, and a broad construction must be ap-
pJjed to the word "industrial," which would include the 
rnilroad industry, since it is in the generally undefined 
l'Wmpted area. 
Jn addition, in the present case the complete legisla-
ti\'e history of the Utah statute was and is available and 
"XJH'eRsly Pxeluded the railroad industry from the scope 
(Jf "eonnnereial" consumption. It is apparent from ex-
amining the Attorney General's Opinion that no attempt 
'1 a~ lllade to d(~fine the material terms involved by look-
ing to the context of their use in the statute or in the 
if'gislative history. 
This iR graphically illustrated on page 3 of the Opin-
i"n (R. 2()) where the application of the abstract defini-
tion of "industrial" produces a final result in direct vio-
lation of the manifest legislative intent. It states: "* * * 
ii 1' beliPved that the predominant character of the rail-
1110il lmsineRR it-> connnereial in nature; that is, it does 
11
''
1 inyo]w manufacturing or fabrication." However, as 
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we have heretofore pointed out in Point I, for the expre,, 
purpose of preventing industrial consumption to be 1,. 
stricted and limited to manufacturing, the Senate in 19:1: 
defeated a proposed proviso to 616 (a) that the tax woulri 
"not apply to the sale of electric energy sold for mauu 
facturing purposes." (R. 12) 
The second factor applied by the Opinion is base1i 
upon the unfounded presumption that the basic distiiic 
tion between commercial and industrial consumption 1, 
dependent upon whether or not the consumption of tlw 
energy or fuel constitutes the last opportunity to im]M' 
the tax. If it is, the use is commercial; if it is not, usini 
the analogy of a wholesale sale, the use is industrial be 
cause the tax will be collected later on the cost of tl1 1 
finished product. 
Such a distinction, if in fact it is a distinction, doP> 
not appear at any place in the legislative history of tl1e 
Sales Tax Act, and until this Opinion, has never beeD 
the basis for the administration and construction of tlJ1 
statute by the State Tax Commission. The proper le>1 
of what is commercial and what is industrial has allra: 0 
been tied to the nature of the business making the llf', 
rather than whether or not a tax can ultimately ))(' iw 
posed on an article associated with the consumption Thi· 
was made clear by the opinion of the Supreme Cour 
of the United States in Wisconsin Power Company 1' 
United States, 336 U.S. 176 (1945). In construing !]ii 
scope of the term "commercial'~ under Section GlG (a 
which was the forerunner and source of the present H11 
statute, the Court states: 
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"'l1he legislative history indicates that the 
tPrnl 'commercial' was meant to apply to the na-
tnt<' of the business in which the energy is con-
~;urned. . . .'' 
ln 11fa cfo;senting op1mon, Commissioner Gunther 
further exposes the error of the alleged wholesale sales 
analogy as the basis for determining what constitutes 
i11dn.-:trial use by pointing out some inconsistent results 
tl11ough its application. 
At pages 74 and 75 of the Record, he states: 
"An adoption of the tests suggested in the 
Attorney General's opinion, while it might in many 
situations produce equitable results, can in some 
!Pad to l!Uestionable conclusions and, more signi-
ficantly, tends to make indistinct and meaningless 
the difference between 'industrial' consumption and 
'c·ommercial' consumption of these fuels. For ex-
ample, application of these tests to sales of fuel 
to a commercial repair garage and to the United 
8tatPs Steel plant at Geneva points out some of 
tl1l•se problems. United States Steel, manufactur-
ing tangible products for resale, is clearly an in-
rlnstrial consumer under the opinion and would be 
<'XPlllpt from tax on its fuel purchases. This is 
1 l'UP PV('n though its sales are out of the state as 
a w·neral rule and promise no later tax receipts 
in (•x:rhange for the exemption. 
"At the same time, Opinion No. 65-038 would 
in1 pose a tax on the purchase of fuel by a com-
lllr>rcial repair garage because no tangible product 
rP1<11lts from such production. But the end product 
of the garage, i.e., service, is taxable under the 
l"tah Salrs Tax Act. Therefore, even though the 
fw•I W<>re put to the same use in both cases, such 
n::; thP propulsion of vehicles belonging to the re-
2G 
spective establishments or to the produdion " 
heat, nevertheless, the commercial establi~Ji 1111 • 11 . 
would pay a dual tax in this state and the inrlu:. 
trial establishment would likely pay no tax at nl! 
It is submitted, therefore, that the funda111 .. nlr1 ' 
premise of the opinion is in error." 
Opinion No. 65-038 states that the third or fi11a 
factor to be applied in determining whether a hu8ilH~· 
is industrial or commercial is to look at its ''pn·domirnu11 
character," citing the Wisconsin Power Co. case, 8upr::. 
\Ve have no quarrel with the application of that prinri11l1 
to the present case, because it has always been an am111 
ed doctrine under both the federal and state tax pr11 
visions involving commercial consumption, and has lwt1 
expressly recognized in all regulations promulgat~i 
thereunder, including Regulation No. 35, presently !11 
effect. However, we do object to the misapplication 01 
that principle in this case. The Opinion concludes !ha 
the predominant character of the railroad businesf i 
commercial because it does not involve manufacturing 111 
fabrication. This is simply a negative application of t1, 
Opinion's incorrect and limited definition of "industria:· 
in an attempt to place railroads in the "commercial' 
category, while ignoring the factor of "prPdominant c1111: 
acter" altogether. 
It was admitted by the stipulation of facts, and sPelll 
obvious, that the predominant character of plaintiff's hn' 
ness is the transportation of persons and property by rw 
In the present case, since the consumption of fuel oil fn: 
the propulsion of locomotives is the very essence of r:i1 
roading, there is no question that such consumption•· 
·r· 
associated with the "predominant character" of plaint1t1 
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fiu-:i11<•c:c;. And, m; we have already pointed out in Point 
1, ,;ud1 buc:iness was intended by the legislature to be 
i•\f'liipt from the tax on its consumption of energy and 
fuel because of its predominantly noncommercial char-
acter. 
Nevertheless, there are some minor phases of activity 
m thP railroad industry, as in other industrial enter-
pm:P~, which may properly qualify as commercial in 
nature and be subject to the sales tax. That situation 
hn~ fJPen recognized in both federal and state regulations 
.'incr• the original tax enactments in 1932 and 1933. For 
~xample the first federal regulation provided in part: 
". . . However, electrical energy is subject to 
tax if sold for use in commerccial phases of in-
dm;trial or other businesses, such as office build-
ings, sales and display rooms, retail stores, etc." 
m. 13) 
Both the i11itial state regulations concerning com-
111Prcial eonsmnption and the present regulation contain 
~imilar language. 
P'rorn our analysis, it appears that the ruling of this 
1·01ut in Tlie Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company 
1
'· State Tu.1 Commission, 16 Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145 
il06:i), on rehearing, could properly qualify as an ex-
eilllple of' the application of the tax to a minor corrunercial 
i'lta~P of an industrial enterprise. However, we also rec-
,,~nir,<· that the facts of that case are at material variance 
ith tlw ]iresPnt one. There is a wide difference between 
1
'
1lJ,'l1111ption of fuel in the propulsion of locomotives 
111 1l 11 • operation of a railroad, including switch engines 
and road pngines in moving pas::wngers and freight, ano 
consumption of coal by a separate and distinct terminal 
company in a stationary pmvt~r plant for tlw purpoRe o! 
applying heat for various terminal activities. 
CONCLUSION 
'Ve believe the legislative intention to exempt th~ 
railroad industry in Utah from the sales and us~ tax 
on its consumption of fuel oil for the propulsion of loco. 
motives is clearly established. We therefore urge the 
court to enforce that intent by reversing the majority 
decision of the Tax Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEYERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT ~l. ~IA'rHESON 
NORMAK -w. KE'l'TNF,R 
600 Union Pacific Building 
Salt LakP City, Ftah 
Attornrys _for Plaintiff 
